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Articial neural networks (ANNs) have demonstrated remarkable utility in a variety of challenging machine
learning applications. However, their complex architecture makes asserting any formal guarantees about their
behavior dicult. Existing approaches to this problem typically consider verication as a post facto white-box
process, one that reasons about the safety of an existing network through exploration of its internal structure,
rather than via a methodology that ensures the network is correct-by-construction.
In this paper, we present a novel learning framework that takes an important rst step towards realizing
such a methodology. Our technique enables the construction of provably correct networks with respect to
a broad class of safety properties, a capability that goes well-beyond existing approaches. Overcoming the
challenge of general safety property enforcement within the network training process in a supervised learning
pipeline, however, requires a fundamental shi in how we architect and build ANNs.
Our key insight is that we can integrate an optimization-based abstraction renement loop into the learning
process that iteratively splits the input space from which training data is drawn, based on the ecacy with
which such a partition enables safety verication. To do so, our approach enables training to take place over an
abstraction of a concrete network that operates over dynamically constructed partitions of the input space. We
provide theoretical results that show that classical gradient descent methods used to optimize these networks
can be seamlessly adopted to this framework to ensure soundness of our approach. Moreover, we empirically
demonstrate that realizing soundness does not come at the price of accuracy, giving us a meaningful pathway
for building both precise and correct networks.
We have implemented these ideas in a tool (Art ) and applied it to the unmanned aviator collision avoidance
system ACAS Xu dataset (Julian et al. 2016), successfully synthesizing safe ANNs that satises the sophisticated
safety properties demanded by the application without compromising accuracy, from scratch.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Articial neural networks (ANNs) have emerged in recent years as the primary computational
structure for implementing many challenging machine learning applications. eir success has been
due in large measure to their sophisticated architecture, typically comprised of multiple layers of
connected neurons (or activation functions), in which each neuron represents a possibly non-linear
function over the inputs generated in a previous layer. In a supervised seing, the goal of learning
is to identify the proper coecients (i.e., weights) of these functions that minimize dierences
between the outputs generated by the network and ground truth, established via training samples.
eir ability to identify ne-grained distinctions among their inputs through the execution of
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this process makes these networks particularly useful in problems related to classication, image
recognition, natural language translation, and autonomous driving, all areas of major interest in
the machine learning community.
Nonetheless, their complexity also poses signicant challenges to verication, in large part
because of the diculty in identifying how logical notions of high-level correctness relate to overall
network structure, a low-level, uninterpretible artifact. For certain kinds of properties such as
local robustness (Gehr et al. 2018; Papernot et al. 2016), which are important to guarantee that
the network is resilient to adversarial aacks (Goodfellow et al. 2015; Madry et al. 2018; Nguyen
et al. 2015), recent eorts have presented techniques that can verify the robustness of an existing
network (Gehr et al. 2018; Singh et al. 2019b) or appropriately guide the training phase used in the
construction of the network (Mirman et al. 2018).
While local robustness properties are useful to prove that ANNs cannot be fooled by adversarial
examples, it is also important to make sure that ANNs behave correctly, operating in ways consistent
with more general specications and invariants. For instance, Figure 1 depicts the ACAS Xu
(Airborne Collision Avoidance System) application developed to handle midair collisions between
commercial aircra (Julian et al. 2016). e system is controlled by a series of ANNs to produce
horizontal maneuver advisories. One example correctness1 property states that if a potential intruder
is far away (ρ is signicantly large) and is signicantly slower than own’s one vehicle, (vint is
Fig. 1. The ACAS Xu System (adapted
from (Katz et al. 2017)).
signicantly lower than vown), then regardless of the in-
truder’s (ψ ) and subject’s (θ ) direction, the ANN con-
troller should output Clear-of-Conflict (as it is unlikely
that the intruder can collide with the subject). Unfor-
tunately, even a sophisticated ANN handler used in the
ACAS Xu system, although well trained, has been shown
to violate this correctness property (Katz et al. 2017).
Existing approaches that are capable of potentially
identifying violations of such properties separate veri-
cation from learning (Katz et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2018c),
which has an inherent disadvantage when verication
fails, given the complexity and uninterpretibility of these
networks. In other words, if ANNs are generated without incorporating provable correctness as part
of their training objective, then there is no guarantee that the weights discovered by the training
process are provably correct, exemplied by the above incorrect ANN-controlled ACAS Xu system.
e lack of a principled methodology to repair networks that are not veriable, however, short
of commencing the training process from scratch, makes the problem of leveraging verication
counterexamples post facto a challenging exercise for which no credible proposal has been put
forth thus far.
In this paper, we target a signicant generalization of other state-of-the-art verication ap-
proaches that enables correct-by-construction generation of ANNs with respect to a broad class of
correctness properties expressed over the network’s inputs. Developing a scalable training technique
developed with correctness in mind that nonetheless retains desirable precision is the primary
challenge to realizing this goal. Scalability is an important issue for any such strategy given the
large size of the input space, and the potentially large number of neurons that comprise the network.
Like previous eorts (Gehr et al. 2018; Mirman et al. 2018), we employ abstract interpretation
methods to generate sound abstractions of both the input space and the network itself.
1We do not distinguish between correctness and safety, and use these interchangeably.
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However, simply generating a safe over-approximation of a network is not necessarily useful
because an excessively over-approximate abstraction may provide imprecise information on how
to further optimize the network for correctness. e diculty in balancing the goal of scalable
verication with accurate optimization in our context arises from the need to integrate correctness
constraints within the gradient descent optimization loop that sits at the core of the training
procedure. When the property to verify is locally dened, for example, as in the case of robustness,
it may be possible to bake-in these considerations as part of the abstraction itself, leading to a clean
characterization of the optimization procedure in terms of the over-approximation (Mirman et al.
2018) induced by the abstraction.
In contrast, in our case, the structure of the optimization procedure must be signicantly dierent
since we do not know to guide the optimization loop by the logical characteristics of the correctness
property a priori. To overcome this challenge, we obtain such information on the y as shown
by the workow depicted schematically in Figure 2. Our approach takes as input a correctness
property (Φin , Φout ) that prescribes desired network output behavior using logic constraints Φout
when the inputs to the network are within a domain described by Φin . In particular, our training
procedure involves an abstract domainD (e.g., the interval domain) and a renement loop over our
abstraction of the input space, expressed in terms of correctness properties dened over these inputs.
A non-zero loss ϵ of correctness of an input abstraction Φiin , obtained by an abstract interpretation
over the abstract domain D via estimating the loss from the abstracted output FD(Φiin) of the
network to the correctness constraint Φout , may indicate a potential violation of the network’s
output correctness. is loss can then be used to optimize the network’s weights to mitigate the
loss of correctness on FD(Φiin) (the right loop of Figure 2). On the other hand, since the amount
of imprecision introduced by the input space abstraction Φiin is correlated with the precision of
the abstracted network output FD(Φiin), we additionally propose a renement mechanism over the
input space abstraction, optimized for this imprecision (the le loop of Figure 2). is abstraction
renement process allows us to apply gradient descent methods to construct networks that are
provably correct, Notably, our correct-by-construction generation of ANNs can be applied with
standard ANN training algorithms, without comprising the accuracy guarantees oered by classical
optimization methods (the top of Figure 2).
is paper makes the following contributions:
(1) We present an abstract interpretation-guided training strategy for building correct-by-
construction neural networks, dened with respect to a rich class of correctness properties
that go well beyond local robustness assertions.
(2) We dene an input space abstraction renement loop that reduces training on input data to
training on input space partitions, where the precision of the abstraction is, in turn, guided
by a notion of correctness loss as determined by the correctness property.
(3) We formalize soundness claims that capture correctness guarantees provided by our method-
ology; these results characterize the ability of our approach to ensure correctness with
respect to domain-specic correctness properties.
(4) We have implemented our ideas in a tool (Art ) and applied it to a challenging benchmark,
the ACAS Xu collision avoidance dataset (Julian et al. 2016; Katz et al. 2017). We provide
a detailed evaluation study quantifying the eectiveness of our approach and assess its
utility to ensure correctness without compromising accuracy. We additionally provide a
comparison of our approach with a post facto counterexample-guided verication strategy
that provides strong evidence for the benets of Art ’s methodology compared to such
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Fig. 2. We train a neural network with respect to a correctness property that induces constraints on the inputs
(Φin ) and outputs (Φout ). The network depicted on the top is one that is not trained with verification in mind
- for any valid input, it produces an output, whose loss is calculated to readjust and optimize the weights of
the network. The pipeline depicted on the boom defines Art ’s architecture; here, inputs are defined in
terms of a partition of the input space (Φ(i)in ). Intuitively, we can think of the collection of these input space
splits as defining a partitioning abstraction over the input space. The network is trained over abstractions of
the original’s propagation and activation functions constructed by an abstract transformer FD (Singh et al.
2019b), guided by the correctness loss imposed by FD and Φout , while generating new weights, additionally
refines the input space abstraction guided by the correctness loss.
techniques. ese experiments justify our claim that synthesis of synthesize correct-by-
construction networks is feasible even when the correctness properties under consideration
are highly sophisticated.
e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a simple
motivating example that illustrates our approach. Section 3 provides background and context.
Section 4 presents a formalization of our approach. Details about Art ’s implementation and
evaluation are provided in Section 5. Related work and conclusions are given in Sections 6 and 7,
resp.
2 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We illustrate and motivate the key components of our approach using a realistic albeit simple
end-to-end example. We consider the construction of a learning-enabled system for autonomous
driving. e learning objective is to identify potentially dangerous objects within a prescribed
range of the vehicle’s current position.
Problem Setup. For the purpose of this example, we simplify our scenario, depicted in Figure 3, by
Fig. 3. Vehicle Radar System.
assuming that we track only a single object and that the informa-
tion given by the vehicle’s radar is a feature vector of size two,
containing the object’s normalized relative speed v ∈ [−5, 5] and
its relative angular position θ ∈ [−pi ,pi ] in a polar coordinate sys-
tem with our vehicle located in the center. Here, v > 0 means the
vehicle is geing closer to the object with the speed of |v |; v < 0
means our vehicle is moving away from the object; and, v = 0
means the object and vehicle are moving in lock-step with respect
to each other.
Consider an implementation of an ANN for this problem that
uses a 2-layer ReLU neural network F with initialized weights as
depicted in Figure 4. e network takes an input vector x = (v,θ ) and outputs a vector y = (y1,y2) ,
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vSpeed
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1
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1
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Hidden
layer
Hidden
layer
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layer
Fig. 4. A simple monitoring system using a 2-layer ReLU network.
where y1 and y2 are the prediction scores for action Report and action Ignore, respectively. e
advisory system picks the action with the higher prediction score as the result. For simplicity,
both layers in F are linear layers with 2 neurons and without bias terms. An element-wise ReLU
activation function relu(x) = max(x , 0) is applied aer the rst layer. In this example, we assume
the activation function in each layer is a simple linear combination of the inputs whose coe-
cients are given by the weights associated with the function’s input edges. us, p1 is dened as
w1v + w2θ = 4.5 where the initial weight assignment shown assigns 1 to w1 and .5 to w2. e
output of p1 is fed into a ReLU unit that emits 4.5 (since 4.5 > 0). e output layer of the network
again computes a linear combination of the ReLU outputs, which serve as its inputs, using the
weight coecients depicted.
Correctness Property. To serve as a useful advisory system, we can ascribe some correctness
properties that we would like the network to always satisfy, as discussed in Sec. 1. In this example,
we focus on one such correctness property, dened below. Our approach generalizes to an arbitrary
number of such correctness properties that one may want to enforce in a learning-enabled system.
Φ : Objects in front of the vehicle that are static or moving closer to our vehicle should always
be reported.
We can interpret the assumptions of “static or moving closer” and “in front of ” in terms of predi-
cates over feature vector components such as v ≥ 0 and θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5]2, respectively. Using this
representation and recalling that v ∈ [−5, 5], the correctness property we want to ensure can be
formulated as:
Φ : ∀v,θ . v ∈ [0, 5] ∧ θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5] ∧ y = F (v,θ ) ⇒ y1 ≥ y2.
Observe that the network shown in Figure 4 does not satisfy this property as discussed above.
us, Φ (and, more generally, the correctness properties considered by our system) can be ex-
pressed using a pair of predicates (Φin ,Φout ) specifying the assumptions Φin on the network input
and the corresponding requirements Φout on the network output.
Correctness Loss Function. To quantify how incorrect a neural network is, we dene a distance
function between the output of the neural network (on inputs satisfying the input predicate Φin )
and the output predicate Φout . For this example, we can dene the distance of the network output
2We pick [0.5, 2.5] because it is slightly wider than the front view angle of [ pi4 , 3pi4 ].
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vSpeed
v ∈ [0, 5]
θDirection
θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5]
p1
p1 ∈ [0.25, 6.25]
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q2 ∈ [0, 4.5]
y1 Report
y1 ∈ [−4.25, 6.25]
y2 Ignore
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1 0.5
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Fig. 5. The 2-layer ReLU network over the interval domain
y =
(
y1,y2
)
from Φout as:
dist(y,Φout ) = min
qΦout
diste (y,q)
where diste (·) is the standard Euclidean space distance function. Clearly, when dist(y,Φout ) = 0, it
follows that y satises the output predicate Φout .
e distance function can be used as a loss function, among other training objectives (e.g.,
optimizing the ANN to mimic an expert’s decisions), to train the neural network using a training
set. However, a general correctness property like Φ is dened over an innite set of data; since
training necessarily is performed using only a nite set of samples, we cannot generalize any
observations made on just these samples to assert a general correctness property on the trained
network with respect to Φ.
Our approach, therefore, leverages abstract interpretation techniques to generate sound abstrac-
tions of both the network input space and the network itself. By training on an abstract input
space, our method obtains a nite approximation of the innite set of possible network behaviors.
By training on a network’s abstraction, our technique is correct-by-construction, intensionally
optimizing over the abstraction’s worst cases on correctness loss.
We parameterize our approach on any abstract domain that can soundly approximate a neural
network’s behavior so that an abstract output is guaranteed to subsume all possible outputs for the
set of inputs being abstracted. In the example, we consider a simple interval abstract domain I
that has been used for neural network verication (Gehr et al. 2018; Wang et al. 2018c).
For example, an interval abstraction of our 2-layer ReLU network is shown in Figure 5. Intervals
maintain a maximum and minimum bound for each neuron, and abstract the concrete neural
network computation F using interval arithmetic (Moore et al. 2009), denoted as FI . Let us denote
the lower bound and upper bound of a neuron u as u and u, respectively. Using interval arithmetic,
u and u can be computed from the bounds of neurons in the previous layer. For example, for neuron
p2: p2 = 1 · v + (−1) · θ = −2.5 and p2 = 1 · v + (−1) · θ = 4.5. For each neuron, the (abstracted)
ReLU function applies to its lower and upper bounds directly, since bound values are maintained
explicitly. Consider abstract value propagation from p2 to q2. By denition of ReLU, the lower
bound of neuron q2 is reset to 0 while its upper bound is unchanged.
Applying these rules, the bounds on the output layer can be computed as y1 ∈ [−4.25, 6.25] and
y2 ∈ [0.125, 7.625]. is abstracted network output fails to show that y1 ≥ y2 always holds under
the prescribed input space predicate Φin . Indeed, the network in Figure 4 is incorrect: for v = 4
and θ = 1, the network generates an output y1 = 1.5 and y2 = 5.25 that violates the correctness
property.
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Our approach leverages the neural network abstraction to quantify the loss of correctness on
the abstract domain. To simply the exposition, we create a new temporary variable yo and apply
the interval abstract transformer for the assignment yo := y2 − y1. e transformer then computes
interval bounds for yo , which produces [−6.125, 11.875], from the bounds generated for y1 and y2.
We rewrite Φout in the correctness property as yo ≤ 0 (i.e., y1 ≥ y2).
We dene a correctness loss function LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ), parameterized by an abstract domain D
(in the example D is the interval abstract domain I), to measure the worst-case distance between
an abstracted neural network output FI(Φin), e.g., −6.125 ≤ yo ≤ 11.875 in the example, and the
output predicate Φout of the correctness property, e.g., yo ≤ 0 in the example:
LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ) = LI(F ,Φin ,Φout )
= max
p∈FI (Φin )
dist(p,Φout )
= max
p∈[−6.125,11.875]
dist(p, [−∞, 0])
= max
p∈[−6.125,11.875]
min
q∈[−∞,0]
diste (p,q)
= 11.875 − 0 = 11.875
where diste (·) is the standard Euclidean space distance function. e correctness loss function
LD enumerates all possible neural network outputs that are subsumed by the abstract network
output to nd the one that has the highest distance from Φout . When LD returns 0, the abstracted
output is subsumed by the output predicate Φout of the correctness property; and, therefore, all
possible inputs subsumed by the abstracted network’s input region Φin are guaranteed to be correct.
However, in our example, LD returns 11.875; that is, the worst case correctness loss occurs on the
upper bound of the abstract neural network output.
Training on an Abstract Domain. Leveraging the correctness loss function, our approach de-
rives the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the network weights and, in usual fashion, applies a gradient
descent optimization algorithm to update the network weights. Note that, leveraging the interval
abstraction, the correct loss function LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ) can be implemented using MaxPooling and
MinPooling units, and hence is dierentiable. Since an interval abstract domain is suited for dieren-
tiation and gradient descent, we can use o-the-shelf automatic dierentiation frameworks (Paszke
et al. 2017) to backpropagate the gradient of the correctness loss function to readjust the neural
network weights end-to-end so as to improve the correctness of the neural network.
Input Space Abstraction Renement. An ANN is correct with respect to property (Φin ,Φout ) if
for every input that satises Φin , the network produces an output that satises Φout . When applied
to an abstract network, the correctness loss function measures the degree of imprecision in the
abstracted output. Our goal is to minimize this imprecision, making it as close as possible to the
behavior of the concrete network, without violating correctness. But, imprecision in the abstracted
output is directly correlated to the size of the input domain. us, identifying ways to reduce this
size, without compromising correctness or scalability, is critical.
e correctness loss function provides a direction for applying gradient descent to train on neural
network abstractions. Like standard ANN training algorithms, we could iteratively leverage the
correctness loss function LD to update the neural network weights until reaching convergence.
However, LD may be overly imprecise since the amount of imprecision introduced by the neural
network abstraction is correlated with the size of the input region described by Φin . Observe that
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if we simply bisect along every dimension of Φin ’s input space and compute the correctness loss
for each of them, we have
(1) For v ∈ [0, 2.5] and θ ∈ [0.5, 1.5], the correctness loss LD = 5.375;
(2) For v ∈ [0, 2.5] and θ ∈ [1.5, 2.5], the correctness loss LD = 3.125;
(3) For v ∈ [2.5, 5] and θ ∈ [0.5, 1.5], the correctness loss LD = 9.125;
(4) For v ∈ [2.5, 5] and θ ∈ [1.5, 2.5], the correctness loss LD = 6.875.
Obviously, the original correctness loss (LD = 11.875) does not pertain to any real data points,
since the maximum correctness loss is 9.125 aer a simple renement.
To use more accurate gradients for network weight optimization, based on the above observation,
during training, our approach also iteratively partitions the input region Φin to aid the abstract
interpreter. In other words, we seek an input space abstraction renement mechanism that reduces
imprecise correctness loss introduced by abstract interpretation. Notably, incorporating input space
abstraction renement with the gradient descent optimizer does not compromise the soundness of
our approach. As long as all sub-regions of Φin are provably correct, the network’s correctness
with respect to Φin trivially holds. However, the simplistic input abstraction renement mechanism
described above does not work in practice because it partitions every dimension; its complexity
is thus exponential to the number of dimensions. To overcome this weakness, we apply an
optimization-based heuristic similar to the mechanism proposed by (Wang et al. 2018c) that utilizes
the correctness loss function to pick an input space dimension along which a single bisection in
each training iteration is performed. In the example, assume dimension v is chosen for input space
partitioning. In the next training iteration, we show the partitioned input sub-regions and their
correctness loss:
(1) For v ∈ [0, 2.5] and θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5], correctness loss LD = 5.625;
(2) For v ∈ [2.5, 5] and θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5], correctness loss LD = 9.375;
e result shows that the maximum correctness loss decreases from 11.875 to 9.375.
Iterative Training. In fact, our ANN correct-by-construction algorithm interweaves input space
abstraction renement and gradient descent training on a network abstraction in each training
iteration by leveraging the correctness loss function produced by the network abstract interpreter
(as depicted in Figure 2), until a provably correct ANN is trained. For our illustrative example, we
set the learning rate of the optimizer to be 0.01. In our experiment, the maximum correctness loss
among all rened input space abstractions drops to 0 aer 16 iterations. Convergence was achieved
by partitioning the input space Φin into 123 pieces. e trained ANN is guaranteed to satisfy the
correctness property (Φin ,Φout ).
3 BACKGROUND
Denition 3.1 (Neural network). Neural networks are functions F : Rd → Re composed of L layers
and L− 1 activation functions. Each layer is a function fk (·) ∈ Rmk−1 → Rmk for k = 1, . . . ,L where
m0 = d andmL = e . Each activation function is of the form σk (·) ∈ Rmk → Rmk for k = 1, . . . ,L−1.
en F = fL ◦ σL−1 ◦ fL−1 ◦ . . . ◦ σ1 ◦ f1.
Denition 3.2 (Abstract domain). An abstract domainD is dened by a tuple of 〈Dc ,Da ,α ,γ ,T 〉
with α(·) and γ (·) being Galois connections
(Dc , ⊆)
γ

α
(Da ,v) .
HereDc andDa are the domains of concrete and abstract elements, respectively. α(·) : Dc → Da
is the abstraction function that maps concrete elements to abstract elements and γ (·) : Da → Dc is
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the concretization function mapping backwards. T =
{(Tc ,Ta) | Tc (·) : Dc → Dc ,Ta(·) : Da → Da}
is a set of transformer pairs over Dc and Da .
Denition 3.3 (D-compatible). Given abstract domain D = 〈Dc ,Da ,α ,γ ,T 〉, a neural network
F is D-compatible i
(1) for every layer д(·) in F , there exists a dierentiable abstract transformer Ta such that(
д(·),Ta
) ∈ T , and
(2) for every activation function σ (·) in F , there exists a dierentiable abstract transformer Ta
such that
(
σ (·),Ta
) ∈ T .
For a D-compatible neural network F , we denote by F #D : Da → Da the over-approximation of F
where every layer fk (·) and activation function σk (·) in F are replaced in F #D by their corresponding
abstract transformers in D.
To reason about a neural network over some abstract domain D, we need to rst characterize
what it means for an ANN to operate over D.
Denition 3.4 (Evaluation over Abstract Domain). Given an abstract domain D and a neural
network F that is D-compatible, the evaluation of F over D and a range of inputs X , denoted as
FD(X ), is
FD(X ) = γ (F #D(α(X ))).
In other words, FD(X ) denes the over-approximated output that covers all possible outputs
corresponding to any input belong to X . is is formulated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5 (Over-approximation Soundness). For any input feature vector x and input range
X , x ∈ X =⇒ F (x) ∈ FD(X ).
Although our approach is parametric over abstract domains, we require the abstract transformers
Ta associated with these domains to be dierentiable, to enable the training over worst-cases
over-approximated by D via gradient-descent style optimization algorithm.
4 CORRECT-BY-CONSTRUCTION TRAINING
Our approach aims to train an ANN F with respect to a correctness property Φ, which is formally
dened in Section 4.1. e core observation underlying our approach is that although the abstract
transformer based on the abstract domain D provides only a loose bound on the abstracted
output, F can nonetheless be trained to make this bound much tighter to improve the quality of its
correctness guarantees. To this end, the training procedure must use precise gradient information
for optimization. Section 4.2 introduces the idea of input space abstraction and renement as
mechanisms that can reduce imprecise gradient optimization over D. Specically, an input space
abstraction induces a set of non-overlapping partitioned input domains. Section 4.3 formally denes
a correctness loss function LD , overD that supplies the gradient of the loss function to aid automated
end-to-end dierentiation. e correctness loss function is useful in guiding both the optimization
of F ’s weights and rening the input space abstraction. is abstraction renement mechanism is
the key to our training algorithm.
4.1 Correctness Property
e correctness properties we consider are expressed as logical propositions over the network’s
inputs and outputs. We assume that an ANN correctness property checks the outputs for violations,
given assumptions on the inputs. Formally,
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Denition 4.1 (Correctness Property). Given a neural network F : Rd → Re , a correctness property
Φ = (Φin ,Φout ) is a pair in which Φin denes a bounded input domain over Rd , and Φout is an
arbitrary boolean combination of linear inequalities over the network output vector Re . Specically,
Φin is in the form [x ,x]where x is a d-dimensional vector of the lower bound of the network inputs
and x is the upper bound. We dene an auxliary function size to measure the size of an input
domain Φin :
size(Φin) =
∫
Φin
dµ .
Example 4.2. In Section 2, the correctness property (Φin ,Φout ) we wanted to train and verify
was of the form: (Φin : v ∈ [0, 5] ∧ θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5],Φout : y1 ≥ y2) where y1,y2 = F (v,θ ). Here, Φin
is the input domain of the correctness property that captures the range of valid values for v and θ ,
and Φout denes a predicate on the network’s output vector.
A correctness property Φ = (Φin ,Φout ) holds on F , denoted F  Φ, i for any input feature
vector x ,
x ∈ Φin =⇒ Φout (F (x)).
In practice, we formulate any Boolean combination of linear inequalities on the output of the
network Φout as a sequence of additional linear and max-pooling layers. e verication problem
is hence reduced to nding whether the scalar output of the modied network can reach a negative
value 3 (see Section 2 for an example).
4.2 Input Space Abstraction Refinement
Recall that in Section 2 we illustrated how an input space abstraction renement mechanism could
help reduce imprecise worst-case correctness loss. We formally dene this notion here. Given
a correctness property Φ = (Φin ,Φout ), an input space abstraction decomposes Φin into a set of
non-overlapping intervals Φiin such that Φin =
⋃
i Φ
i
in .
Denition 4.3 (Input Space Abstraction). An input space abstraction S renes a correctness
property Φ = (Φin ,Φout ) into a set of correctness properties S = {(Φiin ,Φout )} such that Φin =⋃
i Φ
i
in , and ∀ i, j . size(Φiin ∩ Φjin) = 0, meaning that rened input domains are non-overlapping.
Two abstractions S1 and S2 are non-overlapping i the input domains of any pair of their correctness
properties are non-overlapping. We use |S | to denote the number of correctness properties included
in S . Given a neural network F , and a correctness property Φ with input space abstraction S , we
have
F  S ⇐⇒
∧
Φ∈S
F  Φ.
Example 4.4. In Section 2, the input domain of the correctness property (Φin ,Φout ) in Example 4.2
was decomposed into two non-overlapping input domains Φ0in : v ∈ [0, 2.5]∧θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5] and Φ1in :
v ∈ [2.5, 5] ∧ θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5]. us, the input space abstraction S includes [(Φ0in ,Φout ), (Φ1in ,Φout )].
Armed with these denitions, we can now formally state our central notion of input space
abstraction renement:
Denition 4.5 (Input Space Abstraction Renement). A well-founded abstraction renement v is a
binary relation over a set of input abstractions S = {S1, S2, . . . Sn} such that:
(reexivity) ∀Si ∈ S, Si v Si
3Disjunctive clauses can be encoded using a MaxPooling unit: if the out predicate Φout (y) = ∨i cTi y ≥ bi , Φout can be
encoded as maxi cTi y − bi ≥ 0. Conjunctive clauses can be encoded similarly.
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(renement) Given a correctness property (Ψin ,Ψout ), and an input space abstraction S ,©­­«
∧
Si≡( ,Φiout )∈S
Φiout ⇐⇒ Ψout
ª®®¬ ∧
©­­«Ψin =
⋃
Si≡(Φiin, )∈S
Φiin
ª®®¬ =⇒ S v {(Ψin ,Ψout )}
(transitivity) ∀S1, S2, S3 ∈ S , S1 v S2 ∧ S2 v S3 =⇒ S1 v S3, and,
(composition) ∀S1, S2, S3, S4 ∈ S ,(
S1, S3 and S2, S4 are resp. non-overlapping ∧ S1 v S2 ∧ S3 v S4 =⇒ S1 ∪ S3 v S2 ∪ S4
)
e reexivity, transitivity, and compositional requirements for a well-founded renement are
natural. If (Ψin ,Ψout ) is a correctness property, then S v {(Ψin ,Ψout )} if the output predicates
in S are logically equivalent to Ψout and the union of all input domains in S is equivalent to Ψin .
Intuitively, this relation allows Ψin to be safely decomposed into a set of sub-domains. Notably,
rening an abstract input domain in this way does not compromise correctness:
Theorem 4.6 (Refine Keeps Correctness). ∀F , S1, S2, S1 v S2 ∧ F  S1 =⇒ F  S2.
Proof Sketch. By induction on Denition 4.5. We only show the case when S2 is a single
correctness property {Φ = (Φin ,Φout )} and S1 is a renement of S2 in which the input domain Φin
is decomposed into
⋃
i Φ
i
in . We prove if F is correct with respect to S1 then it is also correct to S2.
By Denition 4.3, from F  S1 we have:∧
(Φiin,Φiout )∈S1
F  (Φiin ,Φiout )
Given the hypothesis:
©­­«
∧
( ,Φiout )∈S1
Φiout ⇐⇒ Φout
ª®®¬ ∧
©­­«Φin =
⋃
(Φiin, )∈S1
Φiin
ª®®¬
we obtain: ∧
(Φiin,Ψout )∈S1
F  (Φiin ,Φout )
which leads to F  (Φin ,Φout ) by Denition 4.3. Hence, F  S2. 
4.3 Correctness Loss Function
For an output predicate Φout , we dene the distance function that quanties the distance from an
output vector y ∈ Re to Φout by
dist(y,Φout ) = min
qΦout
diste (y,q)
where diste (·) is the standard Euclidean space distance function. We further extend this notion
to quantify the distance of an abstracted output to an output predicate Φout , based on which the
correctness loss function is formally dened.
Denition 4.7 (Correctness Loss Function). Given an abstract domain D, a D-compatible neural
network F , and a correctness property (Φin ,Φout ), the correctness loss function from an abstracted
output FD(Φin) to Φout is
LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ) = max
p∈FD (Φin )
dist(p,Φout ).
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Fig. 6. An illustration of correctness loss. We show the result of calculating the correctness loss,
LD (F ,Φin ,Φout ), from an abstracted neural network output FD (Φin ) to an output predicate Φout . Fig-
ure (a) shows the case in which FD (Φin ) partially overlaps with Φout . The arrows indicate the worst-case
correctness loss. Figure (b) depicts the case in which FD (Φin ) subsumes Φout . Figure (c) draws the inverse.
The worst-case correctness loss is 0 in this situation as FD (Φin ) implies that Φout holds.
us, the correctness loss function enumerates all possible neural network outputs that are subsumed
by the abstract network output to nd the one that has the highest distance from Φout ; this output
corresponds to the worst-case correctness distance from the abstract output on the abstract domain
D to Φout . Figure 6 visualizes the denition of the correctness loss function LD .
e seemingly formidable denition of LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ) can be computed eciently especially
when D is designed to have maximum and minimum values only appearing on the vertices of an
abstract element as depicted in Figure 6. is condition holds for common abstract domains such
as the interval, zonotope, hybrid zonotope (Mirman et al. 2018), and DeepPoly (Singh et al. 2019b).
Observe that LD is dierentiable since it can be encoded via a MaxPooling unit for such domains.
From the denition of correctness loss function, it follows naturally that when LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
becomes 0, we can ensure the correctness of F against the correctness property. is is formulated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8 (Zero Correctness Loss). Given an abstract domainD and aD-compatible neural
network F , and a correctness property (Φin ,Φout ), LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ) = 0 =⇒ F  (Φin ,Φout ).
Proof Sketch. When LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ) = 0, by Denition 4.7,
max
p ∈FD (Φin )
dist(p,Φout ) = 0
Since dist(·) is a non-negative function, we have:
∀p ∈ FD(Φin), dist(p,Φout ) = 0
erefore,
∀p ∈ FD(Φin), p  Φout
By eorem 3.5, we have
∀x , x  Φin =⇒ F (x) ∈ FD(Φin). Hence,
∀x  Φin , F (x)  Φout
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us, F  (Φin ,Φout ). 
A rened input space abstraction leads to smaller or equal worst-case correctness loss. Consider
example 4.4: when we decompose Φin to Φ0in and Φ1in , as illustrated in Section 2, the worst-case
correctness loss on both partitioned input domains decreases. is intuition is formalized by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.9 (Smaller Φin Implies Smaller or Eqal Loss). Given an abstract domain D,
a D-compatible neural network F , a correctness property (Φin ,Φout ), and an input domain Ψin ,
(Ψin ⊆ Φin) =⇒ LD(F ,Ψin ,Φout ) ≤ LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ).
Proof Sketch. If Ψin is an input domain that is partitioned from Φin , we prove that the cor-
rectness loss on Ψin can be reduced from that on Φin . By Denition 3.2 and Denition 3.4,
(Ψin ⊆ Φin) =⇒ FD(Ψin) ⊆ FD(Φin). Intuitively, since the over-approximated output cor-
responding to a range of inputs must cover all outputs from these inputs, the approximated output
of a subset Ψin must be within that of the set that covers Ψin . erefore, by Denition 4.7,
LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ) = max
p ∈FD (Φin )
dist(p,Φout )
≤ max
p ∈FD (Ψin )
dist(p,Φout )
= LD(F ,Ψin ,Φout )

Finally, we can extend the notion of correctness loss from over a correctness property to over an
input space abstraction.
Denition 4.10 (Abstract Correctness Loss). Given an abstract domain D, a D-compatible neural
network F , a correctness property (Φin ,Φout ), and input space abstraction S , the abstract correctness
loss of F with respect to S is denoted by
LD(F , S) =
∑
(Φiin,Φiout )∈S
size(Φin)
size(S) · LD(F ,Φ
i
in ,Φ
i
out )
Here, for S = {(Φiin ,Φout )}, size(S) =
∑
i size(Φiin). LD(F , S) is essentially an accumulation of
correctness loss of rened correctness properties encompassed within the input space abstraction
S . Note that LD(F , S) is weighted and proportional to the size of the input domain of each rened
correctness property included in S .
We extend eorem 4.8, showing that when correctness loss reduces to 0, we can prove the
correctness of the neural network over the input space abstraction.
Theorem 4.11 (ZeroAbstractCorrectness Loss). Given an abstract domainD, aD-compatible
neural network F , and an input space abstraction S , LD(F , S) = 0 =⇒ F  S .
Proof Sketch. Intuitively, when training reduces correctness loss on each partitioned input
domain to 0, the network is correct on every concrete input subsumed by these input domains. By
Denition 4.10, since both size and LD are non-negative, when LD(F , S) = 0, we have:
LD(F , S) = 0 =⇒
∧
(Φiin,Φiout )∈S
LD(F ,Φiin ,Φiout ) = 0
By eorem 4.8, ∧
(Φiin,Φiout )∈S
F  (Φiin ,Φiout )
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en F  S by Denition 4.3. us, LD(F , S) = 0 =⇒ F  S . 
Similarly, we extend eorem 4.9, showing that input space abstraction renement leads to
smaller or equal correctness loss. is is expressed in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.12 (Refine Implies Smaller or Eqal Loss). Given an abstract domain D, a D-
compatible neural network F , for any two input space abstractions S1, S2, S1 v S2 =⇒ LD(F , S1) ≤
LD(F , S2).
Proof Sketch. By induction on Denition 4.5. We only show the case when S2 is a single
correctness property {Φ = (Φin ,Φout )} and S1 is a renement of S2 in which the input domain Φin
is decomposed into
⋃
i Φ
i
in . We prove aer an input space abstraction renement, the correctness
loss over the rened input space abstraction reduces. is result is straightforward following
eorem 4.9.
Given the hypothesis:
©­­«
∧
( ,Φiout )∈S1
Φiout ⇐⇒ Φout
ª®®¬ ∧
©­­«Φin =
⋃
(Φiin, )∈S1
Φiin
ª®®¬
we obtain: ∧
(Φiin,Φiout )∈S1
(
Φiout ⇐⇒ Φout
)
∧
(
Φiin ⊆ Φin
)
erefore, by eorem 4.9,
LD(F , S1) =
∑
(Φiin,Φiout )∈S1
size(Φiin)
size(S1) · LD(F ,Φ
i
in ,Φ
i
out )
=
∑
(Φiin,Φiout )∈S1
size(Φiin)
size(S1) · LD(F ,Φ
i
in ,Φout )
≤
∑
(Φiin,Φiout )∈S1
size(Φiin)
size(S1) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
= LD(F ,Φin ,Φout ) = LD(F , S2)

4.4 Algorithm
Our correct-by-construction ANN training algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. e algorithm takes as
an input an initial input space abstraction S , which simply corresponds to a prescribed correctness
property. While aiming at guaranteeing correctness, it additionally takes a set of labeled training
data {(xtrain,ylabel)} as an input in order to achieve a desired accuracy on the trained model. In each
training iteration from Line 3 to Line 19, the algorithm mixes network weight optimization and
input space abstraction renement. From Line 3 to Line 6 of Algorithm 1, we obtain the correctness
loss LD(F , S) of the current input space abstraction S that totals the weighted worst-case correctness
loss (with respect to the abstract domain D) over all possible correctness counterexamples to the
correctness properties dened in S . Since the computation of F is over-approximated, it follows
that, if LD(F , S) reduces to 0, the neural network F is guaranteed to be correct with respect to the
prescribed correctness property. In the algorithm, the goal is to train F to reduce the correctness
loss to a very small threshold ϵD . Algorithm 1 records in `A the accuracy loss with respect to
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Input: Abstract domain D, D-compatible neural network F , input space abstraction S ,
learning rate η ∈ R+, training data set {(xtrain,ylabel)}, correctness loss bound ϵD ∈ R≥0,
accuracy loss bound ϵA ∈ R≥0;
Output: Optimized F whose correctness and accuracy loss are bounded by ϵD and ϵA , resp;
1 ®W ← all weights in F to optimize;
2 while True do
3 LD , `A ← LD(F , S), `(F ,Xtrain,Ylabel);
4 if LD ≤ ϵD ∧ `A ≤ ϵA then
5 return F ;
6 end
7 /* optimize */
8 ∇F ← ∂LD
∂ ®W +
∂LA
∂ ®W ;
9 ®W ← ®W − η · ∇F ;
10 /* refine */
11 T ← Correctness properties (Φiin ,Φiout ) in S such that LD(F ,Φiin ,Φiout ) ≥ L|S | · size(S )size(Φin ) ;
12 S ′← S \T ;
13 for each (Φiin ,Φiout ) ∈ T do
14 P iin ← Φiin bisected on a dimension of Φiin according to LD(F ,Φiin ,Φiout ) (Algorithm 2);
15 for each Ψjin ∈ P iin do
16 S ′← S ′ ∪ {(Ψjin ,Φiout )};
17 end
18 end
19 S ← S ′;
20 end
Algorithm 1: e Art correct-by-construction training algorithm.
the given training examples Xtrain and Ylabel. In Line 3, the ` function can be set to a standard loss
function in machine learning, such as the cross-entropy loss.
For the optimization step of Algorithm 1, Line 7 to Line 9 applies gradient-descent on the
abstraction of F leveraging the worst-case loss LD(F , S) and the fact that LD is dierentiable in our
framework. In the implementation, this step is aided by PyTorch (Paszke et al. 2017), an o-the-shelf
automatic dierentiation library. We also take accuracy loss into account at this step.
e code snippet in Algorithm 1 from Line 10 to Line 19 heuristically picks a few rened
correctness properties in the input space abstraction S that account for more correctness loss than
average. is heuristic selection strategy aims to assign the highest priority for loss reduction to the
most imprecise cases. As illustrated in Section 2, input space abstraction renement is performed at
Line 14, enabling the optimization process to be improved with more accurate gradient information.
is snippet can be shown to satisfy the renement relation (Denition 4.5), as formulated in the
following theorem:
Theorem 4.13 (Valid Refinement). For any input space abstraction S , the code snippet of Algo-
rithm 1 starting from Line 10 to Line 19 yields an input space abstraction S ′ such that S ′ v S .
We can formalize the soundness guarantees oered by our approach.
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Corollary 4.14 (Art Soundness). Given abstract domain D, D-compatible neural network F ,
initial input space abstraction S of correctness properties, the output neural network F ′ from Algorithm
1 is sound with respect to S , i.e., F ′  S , as long as the correctness loss reduces to 0.
Proof. From eorem 4.13, we know for any input space abstraction S ′ generated during the
execution of Algorithm 1, S ′ v S . en by eorem 4.11 and eorem 4.6, we have LD(F , S ′) =
0 =⇒ F  S ′ =⇒ F  S . 
We note that Corollary 4.14 holds regardless of the specic renement heuristic used in Line 14,
although an ecient renement heuristic plays a crucial role in making the whole approach scalable.
One such renement heuristic is shown in Algorithm 2 which exploits gradient information to
rene an input space abstraction along one chosen dimension of Φin for input domain bisection.
Input: Input predicate Φin , correctness loss L;
Output: An input dimension for input domain partitioning;
1 larдest ← −∞;
2 for each dimension i ∈ Φin do
3 д← | ∂L∂{Φin }i |;
4 s ← д · size({Φin}i );
5 if s ¿ largest then
6 larдest ← s;
7 dim ← i;
8 end
9 end
10 return dim;
Algorithm 2: Heuristic gradient-guided input space abstraction renement.
At the high-level, Algorithm 2 generalizes the iterative renement strategy in (Wang et al. 2018c)
by leveraging the dierentiable correctness loss function. e intuition is that the gradient of the
correctness loss approximates the sensitivity of the loss to each input feature. Just like computing
partial derivatives with respect to weights during neural network optimization, Algorithm 2
computes partial derivatives of correctness loss with respect to specic dimensions of the input
domain and picks the largest one as the rst target for Algorithm 1 to bisect. e heuristic score s is a
coarse approximation of the cumulative gradient over one dimension. A larger cumulative gradient
of an input dimension suggests greater sensitivity of this dimension to decreasing correctness
loss. erefore, picking this dimension for input domain bisection is expected to beer reduce an
over-approximative correctness loss than other dimensions.
5 EVALUATION
We have performed a comprehensive evaluation of our approach to validate the feasibility of building
correct-by-construction neural networks over a range of sophisticated correctness properties. All
experiments reported in this section were performed on a standard MacBook Pro with 2.3GHz CPU
and 8GB memory.
5.1 ACAS Xu Dataset
Our evaluation study centers around the network architecture and correctness properties described
in the Airborne Collision Avoidance System for Unmanned Aircra (ACAS Xu) dataset (Julian et al.
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2016; Katz et al. 2017). A family of 45 neural networks are used in the avoidance system; each of
these networks consists of 6 hidden layers with 50 neurons in each hidden layer. ReLU activation
functions are applied to all hidden layer neurons. All 45 networks take a feature vector of size 5 as
input that encodes various aspects of an airborne environment including:
(1) ρ, “the distance from one’s own airbone ship to another airborne intruder”;
(2) θ , “the angle to the intruder relative to one’s own ship’s heading direction”;
(3) ψ , “the heading angle of an intruder relative to one’s own ship’s heading direction”;
(4) vown , “the speed of one’s own ship”;
(5) vint , “the speed of a potential intruder”.
e outputs of the networks are prediction scores over 5 advisory actions. As discussed earlier,
these advisories include: Clear-of-Conflict, Weak Right, Strong Right, Weak Le, and Strong Le.
e action with the minimum prediction score is used as the advised action provided to navigation
and control components.
Property Description
ϕ1 If the intruder is distant and is signicantly slower than one’s own ship, the score of
a Clear-of-Conflict advisory will always be below a certain xed threshold.
ϕ2 If the intruder is distant and is signicantly slower than one’s own ship, the score of
a Clear-of-Conflict advisory will never be maximal.
ϕ3 If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving towards one’s own ship, the score for
Clear-of-Conflict will not be minimal.
ϕ4 If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving away from one’s own ship but at a
lower speed than that of the ownship, the score for Clear-of-Conflict will not be
minimal.
ϕ5 If the intruder is near and approaching from the le, the network advises Strong
Right.
ϕ6 If the intruder is suciently far away, the network advises Clear-of-Conflict.
ϕ7 If vertical separation is large, the network will never advise a strong turn.
ϕ8 For a large vertical separation and a previous Weak Le advisory, the network will
either output Clear-of-Conflict or continue advising Weak Le.
ϕ9 Even if the previous advisory was Weak right, the presence of a nearby intruder will
cause the network to output a Strong le advisory instead.
ϕ10 For a far away intruder, the network advises Clear-of-Conflict.
Table 1. Correctness Properties specified in ACAS Xu
Following (Katz et al. 2017), we reason about the safety of the ACAS Xu system in terms of its
aggregate ability to preserve 10 correctness properties (see Table 1). Each of the 45 neural networks
is supposed to satisfy some subset of these properties. All correctness properties Φ specied in (Katz
et al. 2017) can be formulated in terms of input (Φin ) and output (Φout ) predicates as discussed in
Section 4.1.
Input predicates are formalized as constraints on input vectors. For example, correctness property
ϕ1 states that “when the intruder is distant and signicantly slower than one’s own ship, then the
score of a Clear-of-Conflict advisory action should always be below a certain threshold”. Informal
notions such as “intruder is distant” and “intruder is signicantly slower than ownship” are concretely
interpreted in an input predicate, for example, as “ρ ≥ 55947.691” and “vown ≥ 1145 ∧vint ≤ 60”,
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respectively. e corresponding output predicate is formalized by the constraint that “the Clear-of-
Conflict score will always be less than 1500.” e interpretations we use in our experiments are
adapted directly from (Katz et al. 2017).
Similar to the illustrative example in Section 2, we can quantify a correctness violation distance
dist(y,ϕ1) = max(ycoc − 1500, 0)
where ycoc is the maximum possible value for prediction score of a Clear-of-Conflict advisory
action. As an example of a more sophisticated correctness property, ϕ5 states that “if the intruder is
near and approaching from the le, the network advises Strong Right”. e input predicate can be
formulated as constraints on input feature vectors as before, while the output predicate asserts that
“the prediction score for strong right is minimal among all categories”; recall that ACAS Xu system
chooses the action with minimum prediction score as its advised action. Interpreted under abstract
domains that concretize an output abstraction into lower and upper bounds, this output predicate
asserts that ∀i = {1, . . . , 5} ∧ i , StrongRight,ysr ≤ yi where ysr represents the upper bound of
prediction score for Strong Right and yi is the lower bound, respectively. To quantify the output
predicate violation for further optimization, we can formulate a suitable distance metric as before:
dist(y,ϕ5) = max
i
disti
where disti (y,ϕ5) = max(ysr − yi , 0).
5.2 Setup
Our evaluation studies the utility of building correct-by-construction networks that satisfy this set
of correctness properties. We show that even in the simple scenarios considered by the ACAS Xu
benchmark, a dynamic renement mechanism capable of generating ne-grained input abstractions
is essential to balancing notions of safety and accuracy.
For our experiments, we consider the construction of 8 distinct networks, each of which are
expected to satisfy a particular set of correctness properties; to test the ability of our system to
handle sophisticated correctness conditions, these properties include meaningful conjunctions of
the base set of 10 correctness properties identifed in (Katz et al. 2017). ese networks have the
same structure as the original 45 networks from Acas Xu, but as explained below were trained
using a more curated and balanced dataset than was used in the original benchmark. In Table 2, we
present details of this base setup.
Unfortunately, the training and test set of ACAS Xu is not publicly available online. We, therefore,
used the provided networks given in (Julian et al. 2016) as oracles to sample data points. A total of
10k training set data and 5k test set data were sampled from 8 networks in the 45 network array
that cover all occuring correctness property conjunctions in ACAS Xu. However, there is a degree
of bias in almost all its networks’ behaviors. Networks trained on data that results in predicted
outputs overwhelmingly biased towards Clear-of-Conflict advisories are not particularly useful for
an evaluation study such as ours. Clearly, applying our training algorithm over the dataset used to
construct such a network may trivially yield a safe network that exhibits high accuracy with respect
to the original by simply returning this advisory regardless of the environment conguration found
in the test data. Indeed, many of the ACAS Xu datasets used to train its networks exhibit this kind
of bias, an unsurprising result given that much of the time, an unmanned controller is operating in
airspace free of intruder objects.
Nonetheless, such biases complicate evaluation. We overcome the presence of these imbalances in
our training data by structuring our sampling procedure to ensure that output labels are uniformily
distributed among the set of advisories under consideration. All of our experiments are conducted
against these more equitably balanced datasets.
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Network Properties Epochs Accuracy ReluVal Time (s) Safe?
N1 ϕ1 51 85.99% 1.65 True
N2 ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4 51 81.94% 1.66 False
N3 ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ϕ8 51 93.72% 2.17 False
N4 ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ϕ9 51 75.86% 2.52 False
N5 ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ϕ10 51 81.97% 2.81 False
N6 ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4 51 69.18% 2.29 False
N7 ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ϕ5 ∧ ϕ6 51 69.58% 1.89 False
N8 ϕ1 ∧ ϕ7 51 99.74% 4.07 True
Table 2. Training results for various networks and the properties we expect them to satisfy taken from the
ACAS Xu dataset.
Because the networks described in Table 2 were not trained with safety in mind, Column Safe?
indicates whether the trained network (equipped with no guarantees of safety) was able to be
validated by ReluVal (Wang et al. 2018c), a state-of-the-art neural network verier that, unlike
systems such as Reluplex (Katz et al. 2017), does not rely on SMT theorem provers, and thus exhibits
signicantly beer scalability properties. e datasets used to train each network was chosen to
facilitate its ability to satisfy a particular correctness property (or conjunction of such properties).
Observe that of the 8 correctness properties considered, only two networks (N1 and N8) were
deemed to be safe; notably, the safety properties tested for these networks were among the simplest
of properties we considered.
5.3 Applying Art to ACAS Xu
Table 3 presents statistics on the eectiveness of applying Algorithm 1 to generate 8 new networks,
each corresponding to the networks described in Table 2, but trained with the corresponding
correctness properties in mind. All of our networks were trained with a network abstraction based
on the DeepPoly abstract domain (Singh et al. 2019b), which combines oating point polyhedra
with intervals. During each epoch (i.e., each iteration of the outermost while loop in Algorithm 1),
our implementation renes up to 100 abstractions at a time that expose the largest correctness
losses. e specic optimization setup follows standard practices. We set the learning rate to be
0.005 and follow a learning rate decay policy if the loss has been stable for some time.
With Renement Without Renement
Network Epochs Time (s) # Abstractions Epochs Time (s)
Nˆ1 1 0.03 1 2 0.04
Nˆ2 4 0.15 13 12 0.29
Nˆ3 6 0.30 41 10 0.25
Nˆ4 8 0.71 170 8 0.19
Nˆ5 18 4.31 494 timeout timeout
Nˆ6 1 0.03 4 1 0.02
Nˆ7 34 54.13 2836 timeout timeout
Nˆ8 6 0.40 87 10 0.23
Table 3. Using Art to build correct-by-construction networks for the ACAS Xu dataset
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From Table 3, there are two distinguishing cases that directly shows the importance of ner-
grained abstractions, as indicated by network Nˆ5 and Nˆ7. Training a network with these properties
in mind requires running over a large number of epochs and abstractions, suggesting that they are
harder properties to satisfy to convergence. e time to train these networks, with input space
abstraction renement enabled is quite fast, typically on the order of a few seconds. On the other
hand, without renement, training on a small number of coarse-grained abstractions can lead to
non-termination (or lack of convergence); indeed, with relatively few training samples used in
our experiments, it is conceivable to get trapped in some local minima when renement is not
exploited. A timeout is triggered aer 2000 epochs.
5.4 Accuracy Preservation
ere is important interplay between notions of correctness and accuracy. As discussed above,
safety could be trivially realized by always producing advisories consistent with the correctness
property’s output predicate, even at the cost of a high misprediction rate. But, since Algorithm 1
fuses both correctness and accuracy loss in the training algorithm, our expectation is that accuracy
should not be compromised in pursuit of safety.
To justify this claim, we compare the network trained by Art with the corresponding network
trained without correctness in mind. During optimization, we train the network for at least
50 epochs using both sampled data points and rened correctness property abstractions. is
requirement of at least 50 epochs is to ensure that the training set is well-explored. Aer 50 epochs,
the training loop terminates once it ensures that the correctness loss reduces to 0.
In each training epoch, we collect (1) the standard cross entropy loss for predictions on individual
data points and (2) the correctness loss as dened in Section 4.3 on input abstractions. e sum of
these two losses are used for back-propagation using the Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba 2015)
with mini-batches. e learning rate is initially set to 0.005 and decreases following a learning rate
decay policy. e entire procedure follows Algorithm 1 except that we boost the training process
by allowing the initial abstractions to be rened even before optimization.
In each gure, we plot ve lines of accuracy statistics as the training iteration proceeds. A red
bar of y = 1 corresponding to standard data-driven training techniques is the base line of all other
curves. A point in the gure represents the relative accuracy comparison w.r.t. standard practice at
this epoch. Above the base line indicates it is performing beer.
Figure 7 shows results for each network under our investigation in this experiment. Each
subgure plots the eect of applying dierent abstraction mechanisms on accuracy, normalized to
the results of the original (unsafe) network. All networks exhibited similar traits:
(1) When trained with a xed abstraction (the black line), accuracy with respect to the origi-
nal network oen degrades substantially and also exhibits instability across epochs. As
described earlier, a xed (sound) abstraction guarantees safety but the potential cost of
imprecision. ese graphs quantify these costs which, for this benchmark, are oen signi-
cant.
(2) Using a renement abstraction (e.g., “Abstraction 100” means the algorithm is allowed
to generate 100 abstractions of the input space before optimization) improves accuracy.
e ability to generate ne-grained partitions (e.g., “Abstraction 5000”, the blue line) in
many cases, in fact, improves accuracy compared to the baseline network. is is due to
the algorithm treating safety and accuracy loss together yielding synergies that would not
be realizable otherwise.
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Fig. 7. Impact of abstraction refinement-guided training on network accuracy. Results are normalized to the
corresponding (unsafe) networks. The black line represents networks trained with a fixed abstraction. Green,
orange, and blue lines represent accuracy of networks constructed within dynamic input space refinement of
100, 1000, and 5000 abstractions applied before gradient-descent optimization.
5.5 Comparison with post facto training loop
Finally, we consider a comparison of our abstraction renement-guided training for correct-by-
construction networks against a post facto training loop that calls an external verier to collect
counterexamples and feed to training loops. For this experiment, we used ReluVal (Wang et al.
2018c) as the verier; as described above, ReluVal is a neural network verier that supports the
ACAS Xu datasets.
In the beginning of each epoch, ReluVal is called to collect counterexamples regarding each
individual predicate in the correctness property; we considered the property associated with
network N2 dened as ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4. e verication query in every epoch takes roughly 10
seconds to check network safety for this conjunction. If no counterexamples are returned, the
network is veried correct. On the other hand, if some counterexamples are returned by ReluVal,
we collect them and combine them with all past counterexamples. is set is used in the subsequent
training procedure together with data points from the training set. We compute standard Cross
Entropy loss for training set samples. For the counterexamples, however, we do not know which
specic label should be used to eliminate the error. Correctness properties only regulate what
behaviors are allowed but does not enforce a specic repair strategy when the property is violated.
To address this issue, we simply accept all other output categories except the current erroneous
one in the prediction and apply a Binary Cross Entropy loss function for this multi-label training
exercise. e loss for training set samples and counterexamples are both considered so as to derive
gradients and update the weights. is concludes an epoch.
In the experiment, we observe that aer one single epoch using both training samples and
counterexamples, the network degenerate into naively predicting a single output category. is
loops over and over with more epochs since the training set is not changing much. In every
epoch, there are at most 4 new counterexamples being added to the training set (recall that
the network should satisfy ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4); this is a very small number compared to the
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10k samples in training set. We concluded our experiment aer 10 epochs since there was no
improvement in safety or accuracy loss. We believe this result demonstrates the diculty of
applying a counterexample-guided training loop strategy for generating safe networks compared
an abstraction-guided methodology.
6 RELATEDWORK
It is well-known that neural networks are not robust. is becomes a serious problem when ANNs
are applied to safety-critical applications. Robust optimization techniques (e.g., (Goodfellow et al.
2015; Madry et al. 2018; Pei et al. 2017)) aim to overcome this problem by trying to augment training
data by adversarial examples at each training step. While empirical evidence shows that resulting
models are robust against many aacks, we cannot guarantee that a dierent kind of adversary
cannot falsify the model. is has driven the need for formal verication. Tremendous progress
has been made in this investigation ranging from exact veriers that run in exponential time and
relaxed veriers that are ecient but incomplete.
Exact ANN Veriers. For ReLU networks, exact veriers provide exact robustness bounds but
are expensive and dicult to scale due to the NP-completeness for solving such a problem (as
they perform exhaustive enumeration in the worst case). ey solve the verication problem by
typically employing Mixed Integer Linear Programming solvers ((Cheng et al. 2017; Dua et al.
2018; Fischei and Jo 2017; Lomuscio and Maganti 2017; Tjeng et al. 2019; Xiao et al. 2019)) or
Satisability Modulo eories solvers ((Carlini et al. 2017; Ehlers 2017; Katz et al. 2017; Scheibler
et al. 2015)). Scaling these methods to large neural networks is challenging.
Relaxed ANN Veriers. Relaxed veriers trade completeness for computational eciency by
solving a convex relaxation of the verication problem. Incomplete methods provide robustness
bounds that can be loose. However, they show much more promise to scale to larger and deeper
ANNs than exact veriers. For example, (Raghunathan et al. 2018b) formulated the verication of
ReLU networks as a quadratic programming problem, which can then be relaxed and solved using
an ecient semidenite programming solver. Inspired by the success of applying program analysis
to large soware code bases, Abstract Interpretation-based techniques has been adapted to reason
about ANNs by developing ecient abstract transformers that relax nonlinearity of activation
functions into linear inequality constraints ((Gehr et al. 2018; Gowal et al. 2018; Mirman et al. 2018;
Singh et al. 2018, 2019a,b)). Similar approaches ((Wang et al. 2018a,b; Weng et al. 2018; Zhang et al.
2018)) encode nonlinearity via linear outer bounds of activation functions. Considering the dual
of the underlying linear programming formulation, ecient veriers have also been developed
based on either the dual of the relaxed problem ((Wong and Kolter 2018; Wong et al. 2018)) or the
dual of the original nonconvex verication problem ((Dvijotham et al. 2018a,b; Qin et al. 2019)).
Hybrid ANN veriers that combine exact and relaxed ANN veriers have also shown eectiveness
((Bunel et al. 2018; Singh et al. 2019a)). Most of those veriers focus on certication of robustness
properties only and do not support veriable training of network-wide correctness properties.
Veried Training. As relaxed ANN veriers can scale to large-size neural networks, they have
the potential to be used inside the training loop to build neural models that are veriably robust
to norm-bounded adversarial perturbations. Since such veriers can compute (i.e., minimize) an
upper bound on the violation of the specication to verify, the upper bound can be used within a
loss function (on the worst-case loss over all possible adversarial perturbations) to optimize ANNs
through regular stochastic gradient descent (SGD) approaches. For example, the semi-denite
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relaxation used in the work by (Raghunathan et al. 2018a) provides a regularizer that encourages
robustness. Similarly, as any feasible dual solution in linear programming provides a guaranteed
upper bound on the solution of the primal problem, (Wong and Kolter 2018; Wong et al. 2018) exploit
the dual solution to compute tight activation bounds that, in turn, can yield a tight upper bound
on how a specication is violated. Alternatively, (Dvijotham et al. 2018a) exploits these activation
bounds to optimize the dual solution using an additional verier network. e closest approach to
our seing is the work by (Mirman et al. 2018). ey introduced geometric abstractions that bound
activations as they propagate through the network via abstract interpretation. Importantly, since
these convex abstractions are dierentiable, neural networks can easily adapt to make the rather
loose bound provided by abstract interpretation much tighter to improve the veried accuracy. A
simple bounding technique based on interval bound propagation was also exploited in (Gowal et al.
2018) (similar to the interval domain from (Mirman et al. 2018)) to train veriably robust neural
networks that even beat the state-of-the-art networks in image classication tasks, demonstrating
that a correct-by-construction approach can indeed save the need of more expensive verication
procedures in challenging domains. Most of these adversarial training approaches exploit universal
approximations for handling local robustness. But they are oen too coarse-grained, using a
universal L-norm loss, and may not be suitable for handling network-wide arbitrary correctness
properties that are not directly tied to robustness. In contrast to these eorts, our approach uses a
novel input space abstraction renement loop to reduce imprecise gradients on an abstract domain
to realize correctness.
Combining Logic Constraints and Neural Networks. Several prior works ((Bach et al. 2017;
Fischer et al. 2019; Ma´rquez-Neila et al. 2017; Minervini and Riedel 2018; Pathak et al. 2015; Xu
et al. 2018)) combine logic and neural networks by deriving a loss function that bridges neural
output vectors and logical constraints with desirable mathematical properties, capturing how close
the neural network’ output is to satisfying logic constraints. e loss can then be minimized with
standard gradient-based methods that train the network to meet the constraints for the given inputs
and adversary examples that are found violating logical constraints (via optimization). Similarly,
Probabilistic So Logic ((Evans and Grefenstee 2018; Kimmig et al. 2012)) was also explored to
translate logical constraints into continuous almost-everywhere dierentiable loss functions. (Hu
et al. 2016) built on probabilistic so logic and presented a teacher-student framework that distills
rules into the training. While experimental results showed that such methods eectively guide the
learning algorithm to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy on classication problems, they lack of the
soundness guarantee that a trained model shall satisfy the logical constraints.
7 CONCLUSIONS
is paper presents a correct-by-construction toolchain that can train neural networks with provable
guarantees. e key idea is to optimize a neural network over the abstraction of both the input
space and the network itself. While the abstraction computed by abstract interpretation can be
weak for general networks, we demonstrate that an appropriate correctness loss function and
input space abstraction renement allow the network to adapt such that the bound on the over-
approximation is tight. Minimizing this upper bound on the worst-case correctness loss over all
possible correctness counterexamples leads to a provably correct neural network. Our correct-by-
construction generation approach can be applied with standard neural network training algorithms,
without comprising the accuracy of a trained model. Experimental results demonstrate that our
technique can be used to realize trustworthy neural network systems.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Proofs for theorems and lemmas in Section 4
Proof of Theorem 3.5. By the properties of abstract domain in Denition 3.2. 
Lemma A.1 (Size of Non-overlapping Abstractions). ∀ abstractions S1, S2, S1 and S2 are
non-overlapping =⇒ size(S1 ∪ S2) = size(S1) + size(S2).
Proof of Lemma A.1. By denition, S1 and S2 are non-overlapping means that ∀Φ ∈ S1,Ψ ∈ S2,
Φ and Ψ are non-overlapping. Moreover, by Denition 4.3, abstractions S1 and S2 imply that any
two distinct correctness properties in S1 are non-overlapping, same for S2. Hence, we have that
any two distinct correctness properties in S1 ∪ S2 are non-overlapping.
en by Inclusion-Exclusion Principle, size(S1 ∪ S2) equals to the sum of all sizes of individual
correctness properties in S1 ∪ S2, which happens to be size(S1) + size(S2). 
Lemma A.2 (Refine Keeps Size). ∀ abstractions S1, S2, S1 v S2 =⇒ size(S1) = size(S2).
Proof of Lemma A.2. By induction on Denition 4.5,
• When S1 = S2, obviously size(S1) = size(S2);
• When S2 = {Φ = (Φin , )}: we have
Φin =
⋃
(Ψin, )∈S1
Ψin
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Now that S1 is an abstraction, by Denition 4.3, any distinct correctness properties in S1
are non-overlapping. So
size(S1) =
∑
(Ψin, )∈S1
size(Ψin)
= size(Φin) = size(S2)
• When Sa v Sb ∧ Sb v Sc , by induction hypothesis
size(Sa) = size(Sb ) = size(Sc )
• When Sa v Sb∧Sc v Sd and that Sa , Sc are non-overlapping, and Sb , Sd are non-overlapping,
by induction hypothesis size(Sa) = size(Sb ) ∧ size(Sc ) = size(Sd ). By Lemma A.1,
size(Sa ∪ Sc ) = size(Sa) + size(Sc ) = size(Sb ) + size(Sd ) = size(Sb ∪ Sd )
All cases are proved, thus proved the theorem that ∀ spliings S1, S2, S1 v S2 =⇒ size(S1) =
size(S2). 
Proof of Theorem 4.6. By induction on Denition 4.5,
• When S1 = S2, obviously F  S2;
• When S2 = {Φ = (Φin ,Φout )}:
By Denition 4.3, from F  S1 we have∧
(Ψin,Ψout )∈S1
F  (Ψin ,Ψout )
From ∧
( ,Ψout )∈S1
Ψout = Φout
we have ∧
(Ψin,Ψout )∈S1
F  (Ψin ,Φout )
From
Φin =
⋃
(Ψin, )∈S1
Ψin
we have F  (Φin ,Φout ). Hence, F  S2.
• When S1 = Sa ∧ S2 = Sc ∧ Sa v Sb ∧ Sb v Sc , by induction hypothesis
F  S1 =⇒ F  Sa =⇒ F  Sb =⇒ F  Sc =⇒ F  S2
• When S1 = Sa ∪Sc ∧S2 = Sb ∪Sd ∧Sa v Sb ∧Sc v Sd , Sa , Sc are non-overlapping, and Sb , Sd
are non-overlapping, by induction hypothesis F  Sa =⇒ F  Sb ∧ F  Sc =⇒ F  Sd .
From F  Sa ∪ Sc we have F  Sa ∧ F  Sc =⇒ F  Sb ∧ F  Sd =⇒ F  Sb ∪ Sd =⇒
F  S2.
All cases are proved, thus proved the theorem that ∀F , S1, S2, S1 v S2 ∧ F  S1 =⇒ F  S2. 
Proof of Theorem 4.12. By induction on Denition 4.5,
• When S1 = S2, obviously LD(F , S1) = LD(F , S2) ≤ LD(F , S2);
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• When S2 = {Φ = (Φin ,Φout )}:
LD(F , S1) =
∑
(Ψin,Ψout )∈S1
size(Ψin)
size(S1) · LD(F ,Ψin ,Ψout )
LD(F , S2) = LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
=
∑
(Ψin,Ψout )∈S1
size(Ψin)
size(S1) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
Now that
©­«
∧
( ,Ψout )∈S1
Ψout = Φout
ª®¬ ∧ ©­«Φin =
⋃
(Ψin, )∈S1
Ψin
ª®¬
we have ∧
(Ψin,Ψout )∈S1
(Ψout = Φout ) ∧ (Ψin =⇒ Φin)
erefore, by eorem 4.9,
LD(F , S1) =
∑
(Ψin,Ψout )∈S1
size(Ψin)
size(S1) · LD(F ,Ψin ,Ψout )
=
∑
(Ψin,Ψout )∈S1
size(Ψin)
size(S1) · LD(F ,Ψin ,Φout )
≤
∑
(Ψin,Ψout )∈S1
size(Ψin)
size(S1) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
= LD(F , S2)
• When S1 = Sa ∧ S2 = Sc ∧ Sa v Sb ∧ Sb v Sc , by induction hypothesis we have,
LD(F , S1) = LD(F , Sa) ≤ LD(F , Sb ) ≤ LD(F , Sc ) = LD(F , S2)
• When S1 = Sa ∪ Sc ∧ S2 = Sb ∪ Sd ∧ Sa v Sb ∧ Sc v Sd , Sa , Sc are non-overlapping, and
Sb , Sd are non-overlapping, by induction hypothesis LD(F , Sa) ≤ LD(F , Sb ) ∧ LD(F , Sc ) ≤
LD(F , Sd ). By Lemma A.2 we have size(Sa) = size(Sb ) ∧ size(Sc ) = size(Sd ). By Lemma
A.1, size(Sa ∪ Sc ) = size(Sa) + size(Sc ) ∧ size(Sb ∪ Sd ) = size(Sb ) + size(Sd ).
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By Denition 4.10,
LD(F , S1) =LD(F , Sa ∪ Sc )
=
∑
(Φin,Φout )∈Sa∪Sc
size(Φin)
size(Sa ∪ Sc ) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
=
∑
(Φin,Φout )∈Sa
size(Φin)
size(Sa ∪ Sc ) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )+∑
(Φin,Φout )∈Sc
size(Φin)
size(Sa ∪ Sc ) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
= LD(F , Sa) · size(Sa)
size(Sa) + size(Sc ) + LD(F , Sc ) ·
size(Sc )
size(Sa) + size(Sc )
≤ LD(F , Sb ) · size(Sb )
size(Sb ) + size(Sd ) + LD(F , Sd ) ·
size(Sd )
size(Sb ) + size(Sd )
=
∑
(Φin,Φout )∈Sb
size(Φin)
size(Sb ∪ Sd ) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )+∑
(Φin,Φout )∈Sd
size(Φin)
size(Sb ∪ Sd ) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
=
∑
(Φin,Φout )∈Sb∪Sd
size(Φin)
size(Sb ∪ Sd ) · LD(F ,Φin ,Φout )
= LD(F , Sb ∪ Sd ) = LD(F , S2)
All cases are proved, thus proved the theorem that ∀S1, S2, S1 v S2 =⇒ LD(F , S1) ≤ LD(F , S2). 
Proof of Theorem 4.13. First, we prove that the output S ′ of code snippet from Line 10 to
Line 19 in Algorithm 1 is a valid abstraction.
To show that S ′ is a valid abstraction, we need to prove that any two distinct correctness
properties in S ′ are non-overlapping.
• is is obviously true among those untouched properties in S \T .
• is also holds between any Φ ∈ S \T and any Ψ rened from T .
• For any two Ψ partitioned from two dierent correctness properties inT , such requirement
holds as well.
• For any two Ψ partitioned from one correctness property in T , the partitioning operation
ensures that any they are non-overlapping.
Hence, S ′ is a valid abstraction. We continue to prove that S ′ v S .
Let T be the top K properties in S accounting for the largest non-zero portions in L and let
R = S \T . From code snippet, we know that R ⊆ S ′ as well. Without loss of generality, let S ′ = T ′∪R
where T ′ is the rened abstraction from T .
e call for partitioning heuristic (e.g., Algorithm 2) is just for eciency. As long as it is parti-
tioning every safety property, we have ∀(Φin ,Φout ) ∈ T , their corresponding rened abstractions{({Pin}1,Φout ) , ({Pin}2,Φout ) , . . .} v {(Φin ,Φout )}
Since T ′ is composed of all these
({Pin}k ,Φout ) , we have T ′ v T .
R v R ∧T ′ v T ∧ S ′ = R ∪T ′ ∧ S = R ∪T =⇒ S ′ v S . 
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